Human Rights

The Founding Fathers, mindful of Cromwell and the English Civil War, were strongly concerned that majority rule might turn into a tyranny over minorities, and searched for some way to protect minorities. Since everyone could imagine being in a minority on some dispute, it was a universal concern. In those strongly religious days, it seemed self-evident that minorities had certain "divine" rights, conferred by God, which mere legislatures must not violate. As dissenting minorities became increasingly secular, the language shifted to "natural" rights, enshrined by purely logical analysis: there exist some rights anyone would give to others in order to preserve them for himself. In more contemporary language, the demand is now for "human" rights, whose source and authority lie mostly in the intensity with which they are demanded, to a point where some believers actually devote their lives to achieving them. Underneath all this semantic wrestling, one essential of any right is universally demanded: no government, whether by king or elected majority, may overrule it.

The founders of the American republic arrived at a formulation: strengthen central majority-rule government to a point where it can be effective, but keep it too weak for the majority to tyrannize a minority. This effort grew out of general perception that the Articles of Confederation were too weak to be effective, so the federal government must be made supreme over the states. But having achieved that, a new concern would immediately arise. Since slaves and poor people would probably always outnumber rich ones, how can a democracy be prevented from becoming a vehicle for slaves to free themselves, and poor people to vote themselves the property of rich ones? This concern was surely heightened by the earlier maneuvering of Madison and Washington to have the Convention delegates made up of the most prominent people in the colonies. The plan was to ensure the new Constitution would be adopted by the little legislatures making way before a Convention of celebrities. It probably did not occur to the two Virginia plantation owners that this selection process would result in heightened concern for the best interests of rich people, but it probably would not have bothered them much. Except for perhaps Gouvernor Morris, Convention delegates were not aristocrats, but self-made men, and with few exceptions successful ones. It is still hard to argue with their instinctive reaction that if the laws made it impossible to be a self-made success, then it is impossible to see how anyone would achieve success fairly. Eighty years later the slave component of this issue was finally settled, so then perhaps the wariness could be relaxed somewhat. And that certainly did happen.

The approach the Constitutional Convention adopted was to weaken the ability of the new government to be misused by a popular majority. They designed a separation of its powers, hoping that a balance of power would develop among the Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches, each selected in a different way. As the matter was finally adopted and ratified, it seemed a little inadequate. James Madison in particular rebelled against the final step of giving the Supreme Court the power to review the laws passed by Congress and signed by the President, for constitutionality. It remained for the fourth Chief Justice, John Marshall, to assert the judicial review principle successfully in 1803, sixteen years after the Constitutional Convention. In the greatest of ironies, he did so in a case called Marbury v. Madison.

This case, strengthened and amplified by later cases with the same effect, was to enshrine the Constitution as the capstone of the legal system in the United States, with all lesser laws consistent with and dependent on constitutional powers enumerated, powers implied, and powers forbidden. This capstone structure, rather than American provincialism so noticed by Europeans, explains why American law has drifted from common law to statutory law, while references in Supreme Court opinions to tendencies in foreign law are greeted with derision. Foreigners were not given a vote in our system, and our system is grimly determined to recirculate the opinions of the voters through the system, especially through the choke-point of the Constitution. In biochemical terms, the Constitution is the rate limiting factor. It is far too late to try to make it easier to amend the Constitution, just as it is surely too late to eliminate the Electoral College for selecting the President. Too many balance-wheels have been hooked to these fundamentals. Blame it on interest groups if you please, but seriously disturbing these fundamentals will surely prove unsettling enough to undermine the interest groups that assail them.

With the blocking of other avenues to overturn majority rule, the system itself has possibly provided a new one, which may some day be named after James Wilson of Pennsylvania. Wilson lived at the corner of 3rd and Walnut, making it convenient to sign both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Although he spoke 168 times at the Constitutional Convention, his name is most often associated with the idea that basic legal principles should be part of the general background of all educated citizens. Sometimes referred to as the founding professor of the first law school, the University of Pennsylvania, Wilson recognized that the actual practice of the law soon drifts away from legal principles and settles on legal mechanics. Law students eventually come to learn that what matters most is what some judge recently handed down as an important opinion which sets a new precedent. Step by step the law moves from principles to precedents, and from early precedents to recent precedents. The system is said to be a variant on the scientific method -- hypothesis, tests of the hypothesis, modified hypothesis and then tests of it -- first created by Sir Francis Bacon. The law, in short, drifts away from Original Intent but does so proudly, not as a subversion of original principles but as a reasoned response to actual experience. Perhaps, in this enlightened process, new human rights can be discovered. Such as a right to abortion, based on a right to privacy, based on something or other you will have to read the original opinion to recall. It is not necessary to be a fundamentalist Christian to be alarmed by this process when it travels so far from the choke point of the Constitution, overturning dozens of state laws as it goes. Entirely too many plain non-lawyers who have no serious objection to abortion have read the Constitution and are now mistrustful of the reasonings of Justice Blackmun, the profession which acquiesced to his action, and the intellectual migration process which is being defended. Whether they know it or not, these are followers of James Wilson, of 3rd and Walnut, Philadelphia.

Jennifer Nedelsky is a Canadian lawyer who has been active in promoting an alternative to our system of using a constitutional right as a legal "trump card for displeasing laws.", as well as the failed European attempt to invent dozens of new human rights as a way of limiting government power. In Canadian law, a feature is called the "time limited notwithstanding clause." The legislative branch in Canada is permitted to pass laws which violate a constitutional right, "not withstanding that right for five years". It is possible to understand the appeal of this legal safety valve, to wait out the popular appeal of a mere fad, or to provide emergency relief in the face of unexpected circumstances. Some of the enduring problems with the legislation passed during the Roosevelt court-packing era might have been more generally acceptable with this clause attached. And it might address the temptation recently voiced by Rahn Emanuel, that no crisis should ever be wasted; it is true that some appalling legislation does occasionally turn out to be useful.

Ultimately, however, we are likely to fall back on the comfort that our Constitution more or less as originally created, has lasted over two hundred years while no other constitution can match that claim. Others have their proposed systems and we have our proven one.

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